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Abstract 
The role that Bernanke’s Bad News Principle plays in the modern theory of 
investment under uncertainty is analyzed. The analysis shows that the actual 
investment dilemma is that by delaying investment firms trade off a higher present 
value of earnings for a lower present value of the investment cost, in contrast to 
previous interpretations of this dilemma. The economic interpretation of the Smooth 
Pasting Condition is clarified too and found to be representing the trade-off mentioned 
above. I also show that investment triggers stay intact despite changes in the profit 
process, if the changes are restricted to the range of sufficiently high profits. 
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1. Introduction 
Studying the source of investment cycles, Bernanke (1983) has formulated the “Bad 
News Principle” which concerns the interaction among the irreversibility of the 
investment in a certain project, the uncertainty about its future rewards and the option 
to delay it. According to the principle: Given the current return, the willingness to 
invest in the current period depends only on the severity of bad news that may arrive. 
Just how good is the potential future good news for the investment does not matter at 
all. (Bernanke, 1983, page 91). 
   The rationale for the principle is that for any project the policy “enter now” is 
optimal only if it dominates “delay entry until Good News would arrive”, where 
“Good News” is the future event in which the value of the project becomes higher 
than it is now. Since the stream of profits generated once the Good News finally 
arrives is collected under both policies, the only thing that does make a difference 
between them is what happens during the Bad News period until the Good News 
arrives. During that time enter now would generate a stream of profits while the delay 
policy might lower the present value of the entry cost. Therefore, enter now is optimal 
only if during the considered delay time the value of potential stream of profits 
exceeds the potential reduction in the present value of the entry cost. This is not 
merely a necessary condition for enter now to be optimal but also a sufficient one 
because if during the delay time the value of the stream of Bad News profits is more 
than how much the entry cost is discounted, then the value of an infinite stream of 
such profits exceeds the entire entry cost. In that case the value of the project exceeds 
the entry cost since this value is based on an infinite stream of profits that is not 
restricted to the Bad News range.   2  
 
Since the late 1980s, an extensive literature has returned to the study of the 
interaction between uncertainty, irreversibility and the option to delay investment, this 
time with a focus on the impact that uncertainty exerts on investment.1 Despite its 
relevance to this newer literature, the Bad News Principle has been mentioned in it 
only cursorily: Most articles have not referred to it at all; Some articles have discussed 
the principle non-technically, but ignored it in their formal analysis;2 The handful of 
articles that have explicitly acknowledged the principle in them are not representative 
of this newer literature since they assume too simple stochastic processes, with only 
two periods or two states of nature.3 Filling this void, I analyze here in detail the role 
that the Bad News Principle plays in the typical cases of the literature using a discrete-
time version of Dixit’s 1989 influential continuous-time investment model.4,5 The use 
of the Bad News Principle yields several results: 
First, it deepens our understanding of the problem of investment under 
uncertainty. So far, the economic rationale for the mathematically derived main 
results of the relevant literature has not been fully understood. In the most recent 
effort to attend to this lack, Dixit, Pindyck and Sodal (1999) have presented a new 
approach that highlights the similarity of the investment decision to the pricing 
decision of a firm facing a downward slopping demand curve. They find that the 
economic meaning of the optimal decision rule is that it represents “a trade-off 
between a larger versus a later net benefit”. However, this result is restricted to the 
case where the investment yields a one-time reward. In the more common case, where
                                                 
1For surveys of this literature see Pindyck (1991), Dixit (1992) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
2See for example the introduction of Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) and Dixit (1992, page 3445). 
3Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Abel, Dixit, Eberly and Pindyck (1995) show the Bad News Principle 
via a two-period model. Drazen and Sakellaris (1994) use a two-state process for that purpose.  
4See Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1976), Dixit (1991a) and Dixit (1993) for the presentation of the 
continuous-time Itô processes as limiting cases of discrete-time processes of the type used in this paper. 
5 See Leahy (1993), Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996), Kngsted (1996) and Sabarwal (2004) as examples for 
the numerous articles that contain models based on the main features of Dixit’s 1989 model.    3  
 
 the investment yields a flow of profits, the application of the Bad News Principle 
reveals that this higher but later net benefit is Good News that is irrelevant to the 
firm’s dilemma and that the firm’s actual trade-off is between a larger benefit and 
later cost. By delaying investment, the firm gives up the flow of operative profit that 
could be gained during that time, but lowers the present value of the irreversible 
investment cost. I also show that this dilemma is in fact what the Smooth Pasting 
condition represents in the typical continuous-time models of this literature. Although 
rigorously derived, so far there have been no attempts to assign an economic meaning 
to this condition.6  
Second, using the Bad News Principle I show that investment thresholds may 
remain intact even when the original profit process is changed, as long as the changes 
are restricted to the good news range. This result may be particularly relevant to the 
study of the effect of changes in the government regulations on firms that make 
sufficiently large returns or, in the individual level, the effect of changes in the upper 
tax brackets. Dixit (1991b) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pages 296-303) have 
identified a particular case of this result, namely the case of an exogenously enforced 
price ceiling. Another possibility for changes that are restricted to the Good News 
range is the endogenous truncation of the price process caused by free entry under 
competition. Studying such a case, Leahy (1993) has shown that the optimal entry 
triggers under competition are identical to those of the case where the price process is 
not truncated by competitive entry. As the analysis preformed here shows, these 
results by Dixit (1991b), Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Leahy (1993) are closer than  
                                                 
6For rigorous derivations of the smooth pasting condition see, among others, McKean’s 1965 appendix 
to Samuelson (1965), Merton (1973) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 130-132). More recently, Sodal 
(1998) has simplified the derivation of this condition. Yet, he too has abstracted from its economic 
meaning:  the non-technical explanations he provides are restricted to the necessary condition for 
optimum of differentiating the value function with respect to the investment thresholds.   4  
 
previously noticed, to the Bad News Principle. 
 In section 2 I develop the model. In section 3 I use this model to show the 
applications described above. Some technical proofs are left to the appendix. 
2. The Model 
Consider a risk-neutral firm with an infinite planning horizon that has an option to 
enter a certain production project. The entry cost to the project is I. Once the firm 
enters the project it cannot exit it. Production yields an operating profit, denoted by Pi, 




     (qi+2) 
 
Pi+2    
 
   (qi+1)   (1-qi+2) 
 
Pi+1     P i+1 
 
                 (qi)       (1-qi+1)   (qi) 
 
    Pi      P i 
 
  (1-qi)   (qi-1)   (1-qi) 
 
Pi-1     P i-1 
 
   (1-qi-1)   (qi-2) 
 
Pi-2    
 





        t                     t+1                  t+2                t+3      
 
Figure 1: The profit process, starting at period t with the profit Pi. 
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The time index is omitted since I assume that the profit process is time-stationary. If 
at a certain period the profit is Pi, then at the next period the profit is Pi+1 with 
probability qi, or Pi-1 with probability 1-qi. Figure 1 is a scheme of this generalized 
random walk. 
The value of the project is the expected sum of the discounted profits. The 
project’s value when the profit is Pi will be denoted as V(Pi). The following 
Proposition 1 establishes that V(Pi) is an increasing function of i. 
 
Proposition 1: V(Pi+1) > V(Pi)  ∀i.  
Proof :  In  the  appendix.               
 
2.1 The optimal policy 
I now turn to characterizing the optimal policy of the firm. Let the current 
profit be Pm. Assume that the firm has not entered the project yet and it considers 
delaying entry until the profit is Pn. At the entry time the expected return from this 
policy is V(Pn)-I, but in the current period the firm does not know the date in which it 
will enter, and therefore - what is the value of the discount factor that multiplies this 
expected return. The firm also must consider what is the return that can be collected 
until the profit reaches Pn. These variables are defined and denoted below: 
 
Em,n - The present value of the stream of profits that the project yields while the 
profit evolves from its current level, Pm, until it reaches Pn for the first time   6  
 
(excluding the profit Pn received when the process finally hits Pn).7 
 
Bm,n - The value of the discount factor, (1+r)
-T, where T is the number of periods 
until the profit is Pn for the first time, starting at Pm (excluding the period in 
which the process finally hits Pn).  
 
These definitions enable the following dynamic programming presentation of 
the project’s value function for each m and n: 
 
(1)     V(Pm) ≡ Em,n + Bm,nV(Pn).  
 
Suppose that the current profit is Pi. The standard N.P.V. rule tells us that the 
policy “enter now” is better than the policy “never enter” if V(Pi)-I>0. However, other 
policies are possible too. One example is the policy “delay entry until the profit is 
Pi+1”. The expected return from this policy is denoted by F(Pi) and satisfies: 
 
(2)     F(Pi) = Bi,i+1[V(Pi+1) - I]. 
 
“Enter now” is better than this last policy only if: 
 
(3)     V(Pi) - I > F(Pi). 
  
F(Pi), therefore is an alternative cost that can be added to the direct cost of 
entry,  I. It follows from (2) and Proposition 1 that if indeed V(Pi)-I>0, then this 
                                                 
7There is a positive probability that the price process will never reach Pn.     7  
 
alternative cost is positive too. Applying (2) in (3), immediate entry is preferred if: 
 
(4)     V(Pi) - I > Bi,i+1[V(Pi+1) - I]. 
 
Looking at an equation similar to (4) has led Dixit, Pindyck and Sodal (1999) have 
concluded that economic meaning of the optimal decision rule is that it represents “a 
trade-off between a larger versus a later net benefit”. However, their result is 
restricted to the case where the investment yields a one-time reward. Here, modifying 
this investment rule through the Bad News Principle, using (1), we can rewrite it as: 
 
(4’)   Ei,i+1 + Bi,i+1V(Pi+1) - I > Bi,i+1[V(Pi+1) - I]. 
 
V(Pi+1) appears on both sides of (4’), multiplied by the same term and therefore 
cancels out. Rearranging this expression we get the following condition for “enter 
now” to be better than “delay entry until the profit is Pi+1”: 
 
(5)   Ei,i+1 > (1-Bi,i+1)I. 
 
  Thus, when the profit is Pi, the magnitudes of the profits that are higher than 
Pi, and of the transition probabilities related to them are irrelevant to the question 
whether “enter now” is better than “delay entry until the profit is Pi+1”. The only 
relevant factors are the cost of the delay – the forgone profits during the delay time, 
on the left side of (5), and the benefit form the delay – the expected decrease in the 
present value of the entry cost. Both are related only to the parameters of the profit 
process below Pi+1. Note that the case where Pi+1 is not reached at all and the delay   8  
 
saves the entire entry cost is a just one component of the reduction, due to the delay, 
in the present value of the entry cost.   
  So far I have only discussed the choice between “enter now” and “delay entry 
until the profit is Pi+1”, given that the value of the current profit is Pi. Next, I show 
that it is unnecessary to discuss policies that suggest a longer delay of entry. To do so 
I rewrite condition (5) as: 
 
(5’)   Mi > I,  
 
where the function Mi is defined by: 
 











To gather an economic meaning for Mi note from (6) that: 
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(7) leads to interpreting Mi as the value of the project in the case where there 
are no better news than the current profit, Pi. More specifically, assume that the 
original profit process is replaced by a new one in which: (i) for all j≤i all the values 
of the pairs {Pj, qj} are the same as in the original process; (ii) when the profit is Pi in 
a certain period then in the next period with probability qi the value of the profit 
remains Pi, instead of rising to Pi+1.   
Under this process truncated at Pi, it is impossible to continue focusing the   9  
 
analysis on the event in which the profit process hits Pi+1 for the first time, starting at 
Pi. For this truncated process, the equivalent event is that the value of the profit is Pi 
for a second consecutive period for the first time, starting at Pi. Note that with 
probability qi this event occurs in the period next to the current one. The present value 
of the stream of profits collected until this event occurs is exactly Ei,i+1 as was defined 
in the previous section. Denoting the number of periods until this event occurs by s, 
the expected value of (1+r)
-s is exactly Bi,i+1 as was defined too in the previous 
section. Thus, as (7) shows, Mi is the value of the project if the current value of the 
profit is Pi and the profit process is truncated at this value in the manner described 
above. This interpretation of Mi implies that it must be smaller than V(Pi). Proposition 
2 establishes this result: 
 
Proposition 2: V(Pi) > Mi for all i. 
Proof: Evaluating (1) at Pi and Pi+1 and then replacing V(Pi+1) with V(Pi) yields: 
 
(8)   V(Pi) = Ei,i+1 + Bi,i+1V(Pi+1) > Ei,i+1 + Bi,i+1V(Pi), 
 
where the inequality follows from Proposition 1. Simplifying (8) yields: 
 










≡ Mi.                                                                            
 
Interpreting Mi as the value of the project if the current value of the profit is Pi 
and the profit process is truncated at this value also implies that Mi is increasing in i. 
The reason for that is that Mi+1 is the present value of a stream of profits that starts at a   10  
 
higher profit level and also is based on a process truncated at a higher profit level, 
compared to Mi. Propositions 3 establishes this result. 
 
Proposition 3: The function Mi is increasing in i. 
Proof: See in the appendix.                       
 
Using Proposition 3 I now show in Proposition 4  that if “enter now” 
dominates “delay entry until the profit is Pi+1”, given that the value of the current 
profit is Pi, then “enter now” is also the optimal policy.  
 
Proposition 4: If the profit is Pi and the policy “enter now” is better than the policy 
“delay entry until the profit is Pi+1”, then “enter now” is better than any other policy of 
the form “delay entry until the profit is Pn”.   
  
Proof: Assume that when the profit is Pi “enter now” is better than “delay entry until 
the profit is Pi+1”, implying that Mi>I. I start in the case where n>i+1. It follows from 
Proposition 3 that Mk>I for every i+1<k. Note that, starting at Pi, the profit process 
can reach Pn only after it reaches all the values Pk where i<k<n. Thus, delaying entry 
until the profit is Pn, cannot be an optimal policy because Mn-1>I, implying that it is 
better to delay the entry only until the profit hits Pn-1. For the same reasons, delaying 
entry until the value of the profit is Pn-2 dominates delaying it until the profit would 
reach Pn-1 and therefore also dominates delaying entry until the profit would reach Pn. 
Repeating this argument for all i<k<n shows that for each k satisfying i≤k<n entry 
when the value of the profit is Pk dominates delaying the entry until the value of the 
profit is Pn.    11  
 
  I now turn to the case where n<i. Since Mi is assumed to exceed I then, by 
proposition 2, V(Pi)–I>0. This implies that:  
 
(10)   V(Pi) – I > Bi,n[V(Pn) – I], 
 
 
which follows from 0<Bi,n<1 and from V(Pn)<V(Pi) which follows from Proposition 1. 
(10) shows that when the value of the profit is Pi the value of immediate entry, in the 
left-hand side of (10), exceeds the value of delaying entry until the profit reaches Pn 
for the first time, in the right-hand side of (10).                           
 
  From Proposition 2 it also follows that if (5) is satisfied for a certain Pi, then, 
for this Pi, “immediate entry” is better not only from a policy of a delayed entry but 
also from the policy of “never enter”. This happens since giving up on the investment 
altogether is actually a specific case of delaying entry. Thus, (5) is not only a 
necessary condition for investment but also a sufficient one. The following definition 
concludes the analysis of the optimal policy: 
 
Definition: The Entry Threshold, denoted by PH, is the smallest value of Pi that 
satisfies (5).  
 
By this definition and the analysis so far the firm will not enter if the profit is 
below this value, and will enter the project immediately if the profit is higher than it. 
It follows from Proposition 4 that if an entry threshold exists, then it is unique. 
It also follows from this definition that all the values of Pi and qi in the range 
i>H do not affect PH. This is the form the Bad News Principle takes in this model.    12  
 
2.2 The Bad News Principle and the Smooth Pasting Condition 
In the standard continuous-time version of this model PH is found in the following 
way: First, functions that correspond to V(Pi) and F(Pi) of this model are defined. 
Then, the value of PH is found using the two following conditions: 
 
(11)   V(PH) – I = F(PH), 
 
(12)   V’(PH) = F’(PH). 
 
(11) is known as the “Value Matching Condition” and (12) as the “Smooth Pasting 
Condition.” Dumas (1991) has shown that the value matching condition is not an 
optimality condition. This condition follows directly from the definition of F(P) and 
holds for every value of PH, not necessarily the optimal one. In contrast, the economic 
meaning of the smooth pasting condition has remained not well understood so far, 
although the condition has been rigorously derived. Enhancing the fog around the role 
of this condition, Brekke and Oksendal (1991) have shown that although it is based on 
a differentiation of the value function, in most of the relevant cases it is not merely a 
necessary condition for optimum but also a sufficient one. Here I show that condition 
(5) for the optimality of immediate entry is actually the discrete generalization of the 
smooth pasting condition. To see that, note that adding the term (1-Bi,i+1)V(Pi+1) to 
both sides of (5) and rearranging the resulting inequality yields: 
 
(13)   (1-Bi,i+1)[V(Pi+1) – I]  > (1-Bi,i+1)V(Pi+1) - Ei,i+1.  
 
Rearranging (13), it becomes:   13  
 
 
(13’)   [V(Pi+1) – I] - Bi,i+1[V(Pi+1) – I]  > V(Pi+1) – [Ei,i+1 + Bi,i+1V(Pi+1)]. 
 
Applying (1) and (2) in (13’), and noting, from the definition of F(⋅), that F(Pi+1) = 
V(Pi+1) – I yields that it is optimal to enter at Pi if and only if: 
 
(14)   F(Pi+1) - F(Pi)  > V(Pi+1) –V(Pi). 
 
Thus, the derivation of PH using (5) is a discrete generalization of the smooth pasting 
condition. Note that, as was shown by Proposition 4 and the paragraph preceding it, 
satisfying (5) is both necessary and sufficient for optimality of immediate entry, just 
as Brekke and Oksendal (1991) have shown for the smooth pasting condition. 
 
3. Applications  
By definition of PH, all the values of Pi and qi for which i>H do not affect PH. In this 
section I show how this implies that the value of PH may not be sensitive to the 
changes in the profit process induced by incorporating competition or government 
regulation in the model.  
 
3.1 Government regulation 
A variety of government regulations are imposed on firms that are making sufficiently 
high returns. To incorporate the infliction of such regulation in the model assume that 
it changes the profit process in the following way: There exists a certain k such that 
for each j<k the value of Pj is the same as in the original process, and for each j≥k the   14  
 
value of Pj is lower than in the original process. Also assume that even after the 
change Pj>Pj-1 for each j≥k and that for each j the probability qj is the same as in the 
original process. Let PH denote the entry threshold corresponding to the original 
process. If k is larger than H then PH is also the entry threshold that corresponds to the 
case in which the regulation alters the profit process because it is still the smallest 
value of Pi that satisfies (5). Note that unless keeping the Bad News Principle in mind, 
the result that the regulation does not alter the investment threshold may seem 
somewhat surprising because the value of the investment is indeed lowered by the 
regulation. Dixit (1991b) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) have identified one particular 
case of this general result, namely the case in which a ceiling is enforced on the price 
of the output generated by the project, i.e., the case in which Pj=Pk for each j≥k. 
 
3.2 Competitive Equilibrium 
Another possibility for a change in the firm’s profit process that occurs only in the 
range of sufficiently large profits is the endogenous truncation of this process by other 
firms’ entry under competition. In this sub-section I incorporate competition to the 
model in a manner similar to Leahy (1993). In Leahy’s model (1993) competition is 
characterized by the existence of an infinite number of identical firms with the option 
to enter the market. For each firm entry involves paying a fixed entry cost. Following 
Dixit (1989) each firm’s instantaneous output is on a fixed scale normalized to one 
unit. The market price of this output is a stochastic process. 
When the price is high enough to trigger one firm’s entry, all other firms find entry 
optimal too since all the firms are identical. Leahy assumes that repeated entry by the 
firms prevents the price process from going beyond PH. Other assumptions in his   15  
 
model are that the firms have perfect knowledge of the price level, and that they are 
sufficiently small so that their repeated entry cannot make the price process decline to 
less than PH. Thus, due to these assumptions, the competition among identical firms 
truncates the price process at the entry trigger. Figure 2 describes the effect of the 
firms’ entry on the price process. Owing to this truncation, returns are lower in 
competition compared to the case of a single firm facing a process with no truncation. 










Figure 2 (adopted from Leahy, 1993): The price process in the case of competition. The dashed line 
shows this process had there not been a truncation due to the competition. 
 
The model in the current paper can be interpreted as a discrete version of 
Leahy’s model. A version that is more general in every aspect except for the fact that 
here, for simplicity sake, there is no exit possibility. Beside the additional generality, 
the contribution of the analysis here is the simpler proof of the result that the entry 
trigger is not affected by the truncation of the profit process. To stay close to Leahy’s 
model I shall regard Pi as the output price, instead of the profit, in the following 
section. The properties of the optimal investment policy, as derived in the previous 
t
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sections and particularly by propositions 1, 2, 3 and 4 and the definition of the entry 
threshold, are robust to this transformation. The robustness occurs since in these 
models the output price is the only stochastic variable relevant to the firm and the 
profit in each period is an increasing function of this price.  
Defining the firms’ entry trigger in the case of competition by Pc, I now show, 
following Leahy, that Pc=PH. To account for the truncation that the firms’ entry cause 
at Pc I assume that if the current price is Pc then, the price in the next period, instead 
of rising to Pc+1, stays Pc with probability qc, and becomes Pc-1 with probability 1-qc.  
To see that Pc cannot be higher than PH note that this  cannot be a Nash 
equilibrium. Since in that case (5) still holds at PH, it will always be optimal for a 
single firm to diverge from this equilibrium and enter when the price is PH.  
To prove that Pc cannot be lower than PH note that the value of entry when the 
value of the profit is Pc and the profit process is truncated at this level in the manner 
described above is given by Mc which is smaller than I as follows from c<H, the 
definition of PH and Proposition 3.                               
  PH, therefore, is the optimal entry threshold for a competitive firm too. In 
competition profits should not exceed the normal return, and this is the case here too. 
It follows from proposition 3 and its proof that, if (5) is an equality, V(PH) = I and 
profits for a competitive firm in this model are zero. If (5) is a strict inequality, then 
PH is the entry threshold that yields the smallest non-negative profits.  
  Extending the analysis to a case where the parameters of the price process 
depend on the market size, as was also done by Leahy, is possible in the current 
framework as well. In this case, in addition to truncating the price process, entry by 
the firms also changes the market size and therefore changes the price process.   17  
 
Modifying the model to account for this property requires adding an index that shows 
the market size and increases whenever the entry trigger is hit. It is also necessary to 
follow Leahy in assuming that each firm is sufficiently small such that its own entry 
has only an infinitely small effect on the price process’ parameters. Because of this 
assumption the market size index has the same value in all the relevant equations of 
the current model, rendering its results robust to this modification of the model. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have demonstrated Bernanke’s Bad News Principle in a 
framework in which the profit flow is a process characterized by infinite-time, infinite 
state space and gradual changes, typical assumptions in the literature on investment 
under uncertainty. The model was then used to show that investment triggers might 
stay unaffected even when the original profit process undergoes a truncation. Leahy 
(1993) and Dixit (1991b) have already identified two cases related to this rather 
general result and the analysis preformed here shows their results are closer than 
previously noticed to the Bad News Principle. 
  In the current paper it was assumed that once the firm has entered the project, 
it cannot exit it. Incorporating exit to the analysis will lead to a “Good News 
Principle” with regard to the exit decision: at any level of the profit process, the 
decision to exit at that level does not depend on any of the parameters of the profit 
process below that level. It only depends on the parameters related to higher profit 
levels. In such a case there are going to be two thresholds level, the higher one for 
entry and the lower one for exit, and their values will depend only on the parameters 
of the profit process related to the profit levels between these two thresholds. Abel, 




The following definitions and relations are necessary to the proofs of the lemmas and 
propositions in this appendix: 
 
fm,n,j  - the probability that it takes j periods until the profit process reaches the level 
Pn for the first time, starting at the level Pm (excluding the period in which 
the process finally hits Pn).  
 
Em,n,j - The present value of the sum of the profits that the project yields while the 
profit evolves from its current level, Pm, until it reaches Pn for the first time 
(excluding the profit Pn received when the process finally hits Pn) given that 
it takes j periods (excluding the period in which the process finally hits Pn) 
 
From these definitions it follows that: 
 
(a3)   Ei,i+1,1 = Ei,i-1,1 = Pi. 
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Lemma 1 below is required for the proof of Proposition 1 and Proposition 3: 
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Lemma 1:  (i)    Ei,i+1 ≤ Pi
r
r + 1 (1 – Bi,i+1),     (ii)   Ei+1,i ≥ Pi+1
r
r + 1 (1 – Bi,i+1). 
Proof: It follows from the definition of Ei,i+1,j that: 













































Using this in (a4) yields: 
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where the last equality springs from (a5). This proves (i). The proof of (ii) is similar.  
 
Proposition 1: V(Pi+1)>V(Pi)  ∀i. 
Proof: From the two parts of Lemma 1, and since Pi+1 > Pi, it follows that:  
 





































Applying Ei,i+1=V(Pi)–Bi,i+1V(Pi+1) and Ei+1,i=V(Pi+1)–Bi+1,iV(Pi) in (a8) yields: 
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which simplifies to: V(Pi+1) ≥ V(Pi) .                 
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 Lemma  2 below is required to prove Proposition 3: 
 
Lemma 2:   (i)  Ei+1,i+2 =  () ( )
() 1 , 1
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Proof: In order to prove (i) note that there are two possibilities by which the profit can 
move from Pi+1 to Pi+2. First, with probability qi+1, the value of Ei+1,i+2 is Pi+1 because 
the profit moves directly from Pi+1 to Pi+2 at the next period. In the second case, with 
probability (1-qi+1) the profit moves from Pi+1 to Pi. Then, from state Pi the profit must 
return to Pi+1 before it can finally reach Pi+2. The expected value of the stream of the 
profits received until the price process moves back to Pi+1 is Ei,i+1. After the price is 
again Pi+1 the present value of profits that will be collected until the profit is finally 
Pi+2. This value is, once again, Ei+1,i+2. This analysis takes the following form: 
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Simplifying this equation yields (i). Similar considerations lead to: 
 




















which, when simplified, yields (ii).                               21  
 
 
Proposition 3: The function Mi is increasing in i. 
Proof: It follows from both parts of Lemma 2 that for each i: 
 
(a12)   Mi+1 ≡ 
() ( )
() ( )
() ( ) 1 , 1
1
1 , 1
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 ≡ Mi. 
 
The second equality follows from lemma 2, the first inequality follows from Pi+1≥Pi 
and the second inequality follows from part 1 of Lemma 1.                                  
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